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This study of a Portuguese chemical company acquired by a multinational, and, thus going 
through an integration process, aims to understand the process of a Management Accounting 
(MA) change. Over three decades, the mentioned company was subject to several changes in 
ownership and external context, regarding economic and regulatory conditions. Following its 
last acquisition, the company had to comply with new requirements and targets from the parent 
company, namely in terms of value creation. Hence, control mechanisms, including stricter 
KPIs, were set. A hybrid framework was, therefore, developed to analyse the case thoroughly.  
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This study examines a Portuguese chemical company's Management Accounting (MA) 
change after acquisition by an English multinational company in 2020. Within the scope of this 
research is the analysis of MA changes in the past, paying particular attention to the last 
implemented change. 
This company is a noteworthy case due to several changes in its ownership structure over the 
years, which has had an impact on its business strategies, goals, and, consequently, MA 
practices. It started as part of a multinational enterprise; then, it became a family business and, 
twenty years later, it joined a multinational, again. Along the way, external pressures prompted 
MA changes, and institutional factors, at the micro-level, both facilitated and constrained its 
implementation. The interviewed employees have worked for the company since the beginning, 
allowing a retrospective approach and reconstitution of its evolution. New MA systems, online 
portals, new budget approaches, new MA tools, and a more extensive range of KPIs were 
introduced to keep up with the new requirements of the management board and comply with 
external demands. 
Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on understanding the factors that prompted the 
change, the predisposition of an organisation to succeed, the process structure, and the 
advancing forces for and barriers to change. Since the frameworks existent in literature are not 
enough to explain the complex reality of an MA change, a new hybrid framework was 
developed to ensure a complete and holistic analysis. This framework addresses specific 
institutional features at both the macro and micro level, acknowledging their strong dependence 
on organisational contingencies. It is built upon extensive literature and the analysis of a range 
of case studies portraying MA changes. The case presented above will, then, be analysed in 
light of this hybrid framework. It is expected to be a useful tool to identify the real-life forces 
that affect an MA change, enabling scenario outcome prediction. Through a pre-evaluation, 
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change leaders will be able to envisage the issues that will require more attention and the key 
organisational strengths that should be powered to facilitate the MA change.  
2. Literature Review 
 2.1 Institutional Theory 
Institution theorists have thoroughly studied the MA change process. In the 1990s, many 
researchers drew on New Institutional Economics (NIE) to explain MA changes (Scapens, 
2006). At the time, literature tended to evaluate MA practice by relying on two neo-classical 
requirements: efficiency improvement and optimal outcome assurance (Speklé, 2001). 
However, theories that claimed efficiency as the key driver of decision making began to lose 
credibility (Tolbert, 1997). Scapens (1994 in Scapens, 2006) suggested looking beyond the 
economic dimension. Production should be perceived as 'an outcome of an institutional 
ensemble of habits and routines which are part of the community experience, past and present' 
(Veblen, 1919 in Hodgson, 1993a, p 394). 
To overcome the drawbacks of NIE, researchers proposed the New Institutional Sociology 
theory (NIS). NIS invites academics to look beyond technical efficiency and brought attention 
to the observable similarity of practices within the same organisational field. The organisations 
that collectively ‘constitute a recognised area of institutional life (i.e., key suppliers, resource 
and product consumers, regulatory agencies, organisations that provide similar services)’ tend 
to adopt similar approaches (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p1 48). NIS researchers set out to 
find a suitable answer to 'why do organisations look similar, and what are the pressures and 
processes that shape them?' (Scapens, 2006, p 11).  
The resulting answer was grounded on the idea that within mature fields, organisations 
develop a mutual awareness of the dominant structures and patterns, i.e., ‘social and legal rules, 
cultural elements, obligations, and expectations’ (Scott and Meyer, 1991 in Dambrin et al., 
2007, p 173). According to NIS, organisations end up incorporating the prevalent field 
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institutions ‘the ways of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence embedded in 
the routines of a group’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p 5). Their motivation is the need to increase 
compatibility with the conditions of their external environment and comply with the standard 
requirements to survive. This homogenisation process is called isomorphism and assumes three 
characteristics depending on its origin: coercive, if it comes from political influence or 
regulation; mimetic, when the motivation is to replicate the conduct of success; and normative, 
when it arises by adaptation to the norms of society and professional bodies (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
Notwithstanding, isomorphism is not an automatic and linear process. Organisations who 
engage in taken-for-granted practice merely for external validation and do not safeguard 
organisational efficiency are likely to end up in the 'ceremonial conformity' status (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1996, p 95). This means that some organisations come to understand that established, 
validated practices do not suit them and cannot introduce them into their day-to-day activities 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As a result, these organisations become loosely associated with the 
institutionalised rules, adopting them only formally for external validation. 
Based on this observation, NIS shows that organisations are shaped by their external 
environment and tend to converge toward the sector's standard. Nevertheless, it only partly 
addresses the different ways in which practice is implemented within an organisation (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1996 in Dambrin et al., 2007). To that end, it is essential to understand the factors 
that ‘shape the actions and thoughts of individual human agents’ (Scapens, 2006, p 11):  what 
motivates organisations only to adopt practices on a ceremonial basis, as described above 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977)? Conversely, what prompts employees to implement, internalise, 




In this context, the Old Institutional Economics theory (OIE) sheds light on the relationship 
between an organisation's internal 'package' and the way it reacts and introduces new practices. 
OIE proposes to examine the behaviour of economic agents when it comes to rules, routines, 
and institutions (Scapens, 2006). OIE researchers, like Veblen (1896), argued that a theory, to 
understand practice adoption and evolution in full, must acknowledge how strongly it depends 
on organisational contingencies and recognise that it is impossible to make a prediction fit all 
cases (Geoffrey Hodgson, 1996).  
Thus, OIE and NIS are converging theories, as they agree that organisations tend to be shaped 
by the taken-for-granted rules and practices in their respective fields. However, OIE goes 
further in recognising that no two institutions are alike. They will vary according to each 
organisation's specific features (Tolbert, 1997). Three theories jointly explain the complexity 
of inter-related influences that shape practice in each organisation (Scapens, 2006). They 
address how external and internal forces influence an MA change, specifically regarding the 
extent to which organisations differ in their established practice, and how that affects the way 
an MA change is implemented in the end. 
2.2 Management Accounting Practices 
Establishing the scope of this paper requires a clear definition of Management Accounting 
Practices (MAPs). They consist of the processes whereby 'companies identify, measure, 
analyse, interpret and communicate information in order to achieve the organisation's goals' 
(Hilton and Platt, 2011 in Sunarni, 2013, p. 616). This study will focus on the MAPs that ‘meet 
the information requirements of business managers in a global, technology-driven world’ 
(Burns and Vaivio, 2001, p 389). World-class organisational leaders translate their strategies 
into specific goals and define performance goals to monitor corporate resources and processes 
(Busco, 2011). Priority goals, such as the resource waste reduction and value production 
increase through effective resource use, are the current trend (Kader and Luther, 2004, in 
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Sunarni, 2013).  To comply with these goals, leaders are relying ever more on performance 
measurement systems (PMS) that integrate operational, financial and strategic information, as 
a pillar for organisational knowledge (Busco, 2003 cited in Busco, 2011).  
For this paper, MA will be considered a set of routine practices (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
cited in Busco 2011).  It will be assumed that its rules correspond to what the collective formally 
recognises as 'the way things should be done,' whereas MAPs will reflect what is, in fact, used 
daily (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p 8). This distinction arises from the repetitive behaviour of 
following routine rules (i.e., taking them for granted), resulting in ‘recurrent action patterns’ 
(Becker, 2005, p 252). This reflects the agency-structure relationship in the process of routine 
human activity. In short, it means that MA practice (i.e., the change/reproduction of routines) 
is constrained by both structure (i.e., rules that became institutionalised) and agency (i.e., 
individuals) (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
2.3 Tolbert's, and Burns and Scapens' Frameworks 
Tolbert, inspired by Giddens' ideas (1976; 1984), developed a model that theorises the agency-
structure relationship in the process of change. Giddens' goal was to establish a link between 
the institutional realm, i.e., ‘the rules and shared models that derive from the history of 
interactions and achieve a status of significance and validation’, and the realm of action, i.e., 
‘the current activities and patterns of agent behaviour in a particular setting’ (Tolbert, 1997, p 
98). The fundamentals of Tolbert's framework are almost the same as Giddens'. The main 
difference is that the former, unlike the latter, is a dynamic model, allowing the study of both 
the continuity and change of practice in a continuous process (Tolbert, 1997), (See Appendix 
A below). 
Burns and Scapens (2000) modified Tolbert's framework to the context of an MA change, in 
terms of the concepts and the dynamics involved in the process of change. However, in essence, 
little is changed. Instead of using Tolbert's term, 'scripts'–the 'observable, recurrent activities 
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and patterns of interaction' (Tolbert, 1997, p 98)–their framework uses 'rules and routines' to 
refer to the same phenomena. Additionally, Burns and Scapens grouped the four stages reported 
in a MA change into two groups according to their recurrence: encoding and enacting fit into 
the synchronic processes group, as they take place at a specific point in time; reproduction 
and institutionalisation are classified as diachronic elements, as they result from the 
cumulative influence of institutions (Robert and Scapens, 2000). 
According to Burns and Scapens, the MA change starts with the encoding of institutional 
principles into rules and routines (see Appendix B). It is followed by the internalisation of rules 
and subsequent interpretation of the appropriate behaviour to be adopted.  In a second step, the 
enactment, conscious or not, of the rules and routines encoded in institutions. Subsequently, 
the institutionalisation level is reached by reviewing or reproducing the rules and routines 
(i.e., routinisation). The final step is institutionalisation, which occurs when behaviour patterns 
acquire a ‘normative character and factual quality leading to the dissociation of individual 
actors’ (Burns and Scapens 2000, p 11). Throughout this process, aspects, such as the extent to 
which agents recognise the rationale behind the change, and the openness of agents to 'disturb 
the status quo,' affect the implementation of change (Pettigrew, 1987 in Tolbert 1997, p 102). 
When there is no awareness of the rationale behind the new rule and routine, the tendency will 
be to reproduce what has been 'taken for granted' (Hughes, 1936 in Tolbert, 1997). 
Both Tolbert's, and Burns and Scapens' frameworks tackle the process of change at a micro-
level scope of analysis. Besides disregarding the external environment, they little emphasis on 
'the role of cognitions and interpretive frames played in the institutionalisation process' 
(Tolbert, 1997, p 105). They do not explain the variables, such as trust and power, which affect 
the agent's attitude toward change (Busco et al. 2006; Nor-Aziah, 2007).  
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2.4 Kasurinen's Model 
Given Tolbert's and Burns and Scapens' shortcomings, Kasurinen's model emerges as a 
promising analytic tool, providing for the factors and circumstances which may, or not, result 
in an effective MA change (Kasurinen, 2002). This is an amendment to the model of Cobb et 
al. (1995), which specifies potential problems that could pre-empt an MA change (See 
Appendix C).  
In brief, Kasurinen's model identifies three types of change advancing forces: the motivators, 
which influence change in general; the facilitators, whose make the implementation of change 
easier; and the catalysts, which prompt the change directly. The momentum for change (i.e., 
the expectation of continuing change) and the leader's role are also identified as change-
promoting variables. Leaders act as pivotal forces, playing a key role in motivating individuals 
and enacting new strategies. Their commitment and timely communication ensure that 
employees understand the need for change, possibly ‘creating, sustaining, or building a 
momentum’ (Munir et al. 2013, p. 202). In contrast, there are forces, both external and internal, 
that hinder change. The confusers generate uncertainty and disruption in the implementation 
of change, such as doubt about the purpose of change; the frustraters suppress change, such 
as an incompatible organisational culture; and the delayers, more ‘technical and temporary’ 
barriers, such as the inadequacy of existing information systems (Kasurinen, 2002, p 338).  
3. Methodology 
Drawing from the institutional theory, the abovementioned explanatory frameworks and the 
analysis of a compilation of published MA case studies (Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Munir 
et al., 2013; Kausurinen 2002, Cobb et al., 1995; Robalo, 2014; Busco and Scapens, 2011; Siti-
Nabiha, 2005; Busco et al., 2007), a hybrid framework was created for this study. This 
framework intends to provide a holistic analysis of organisational change; in other words, one 
capable of examining the process of change in all its dimensions. As Pettigrew (1987, p. 655, 
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cited in Alsharari [2015, p. 490]) says, the relevant framework to study an MA change must be 
'historical, processual and contextual in character.' Based on that, this paper proposes a 
framework that takes into account the following dimensions: first, the setting of the 
preconditions and catalysts for change and, second, the structure of the change process, 
highlighting the forces that either promote or undermine its feasibility (see Appendix D). 
The forces that affect change execution were mostly identified through a review of published 
MA change case studies (see Appendix E). An extensive range of real-life variables that 
positively or negatively influence the process of change were identified. The reoccurring 
aspects were further categorised, according to their nature and predictable impact on change. 
Finally, a systematic analysis of the interplay between the observed reoccurring forces in the 
published cases and their impact on MA change implementation was produced through a 
questionnaire form, here attached as Appendix F. Essentially, the questions are an outline of 
the framework. 
The latter is then used to analyse the case of a recently acquired Portuguese company, 
currently going through an integration process that includes an MA change. This theoretical 
framework is needed to bind the analysis and ‘structure of the collection of evidence’ (Busco 
2011, p 329).  A retrospective analysis, assessing the company's background, was conducted 
based on tape-recorded interviews. Three employees who have been working in the company 
since its beginning were interviewed to gather an in-depth understanding of the MA change 
process (see Appendix G). Additionally, informal conversations provided important insights. 
Beyond that, presentations, excel spreadsheets, and other diverse data sources were examined 
to ensure the reliability of the analysis. The empirical use of this hybrid framework is also a 
way to test its ‘robustness and validate its adequacy’ (Alsharari, 2015, p 495). 
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4. The Conception of a Hybrid Framework 
4.1 Organisational Preconditions and Catalyst for Change 
The first step of the hybrid framework is to trace an organisational profile based on four 
aspects: historical background, industry sector, organisational culture and accountability 
practice. The purpose of this organisational profile is to assess the subject's predisposition to 
change successfully, given that it is recursively intersected by human agency and ongoing 
behavioural pattern structure (Busco, 2011). In this sense, deciphering and interpreting the 
dynamics of organisational learning are important to analyse, as they are part of a corporation's 
DNA.  
Through a case study review, it was observed that organisations operating in strict, heavily 
regulated environments with significant external pressures tend to accept changes effortlessly 
(Scapens and Roberts, 1993). Furthermore, research suggests that external events can lead to 
questioning of ‘commonly held assumptions’ (Burns, 2000; Schein, 1999, 2003; Harris, 1994 
in Siti-Nabiha, 2005, p 53). The same applies to organisations who present significant 
successful changes in structure, ownership, systems and practices throughout their history. This 
is because of their acquired know-how from constantly changing and reinventing themselves 
(Damanpour and Evan in Munir et al. 2013). Regarding organisational culture, it is notable that 
companies with a more passive culture of acceptance and a lack of action-claiming habits tend 
to embrace change without resistance. It is crucial to understand that, as ‘cultural manipulation 
is not as easy as previously theorised’ (Schein, 1992 in Busco and Scapens, 2011, p 324). 
Moreover, when accounting routines are already institutionalised to some extent, an MA 
change tends to be well received, as procedural change is not perceived as unusual. This is 
explained by 'the dichotomy between revolutionary and evolutionary change' (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982 in Burns and Scapens, 2000, p 20). The latter implies incremental changes with 
minimal disruption to existing routines, which facilitates the process of change.  
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An example of these kinds of change is the case, described in Munir et al. (2013), of a Pakistani 
bank. Organisations like this bank, exposed to ever-greater competitive pressure and sector 
reforms, tend to develop an awareness for the need to systematically restructure their ways of 
working to be able to provide information for decision-making. Furthermore, employees 
developed a propensity to passively accept change, as they recognise their duty to banking and 
board directives. Their weakness, however, was its previous record of failed attempts to 
introduce the new practice. Despite their sense of duty, employees felt insecure about the merit 
of new initiatives, undermining the overall predisposition for change.  
Concerning catalysts for change (i.e., factors directly associated with the timing of change 
arising before it takes place [Munir et al.,2013]), the hybrid framework relies on the NIS theory. 
When studying an MA change, it is important to identify the driver that prompted the process, 
since it will also influence the way change is received by the organisation. Burns and Scapens 
(2000) acknowledged that external pressures could not be ignored. Neither can internal forces, 
such as mindset and business performance changes (Busco 2011). Notwithstanding, they are 
often incited by external factors, like a change in ownership or the appointment of a new 
manager (See Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Kasurinen, 2002; Munir et al., 2013; Busco et al., 
2011; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Hence, ultimately, MA catalysts are mostly external to 
organisations. 
4.2 The Process of Change 
Tolbert's (1997), and Burns and Scapens' (2000) change process frameworks are the backbone 
of this hybrid framework. This revised framework maintains Burns and Scapens' interpretation, 
which is identical to the previously conducted examination. The four steps are also grouped 
into two, according to their synchronic or diachronic nature. 
 As mentioned above, both Tolbert's, and Burns and Scapens' frameworks fail to tackle the 
aspects that prompt, drive and constrain change. The revised framework rectifies this failure 
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and addresses them. It still relies on the Burns and Scapens' explanation, albeit, using the 
structure of Tolbert's framework, but replacing of the 'scripts' with 'rules and routines' to match 
the terminology of Burns and Scapens. The reason is simple. When incorporating the change 
drivers (explained below) into the developed framework, a clean diagram of Tolbert's 
framework makes it clearer to the readers. 
In line with that, the dynamics between change and human agency are also contemplated in 
this hybrid framework (Hinings, 1996). To this end, a complementary analysis grounded on 
Kasurinen's (2002) model was added to expose the advancing forces and barriers to change 
efficiently. This hybrid framework advances Kasurinen's model, in that, the forces and barriers 
to change are grouped. Instead of grouping the forces based on their positive or negative 
impacts, the present study groups them according to their nature as suggested by Burns and 
Scapens (2000), as further explained below. The rationale for this categorisation a clearer guide 
for the user to follow when conducting their analysis.  
 4.3 The Influencing Forces 
4.3.1  The First Step: Encoding and Enacting 
Through the analysis of published case studies, three main aspects were identified as forces 
that influence encoding and enactment: the nature of the change leader, the nature of the 
agents subject to change and the nature of the accounting change. According to Kasurinen's 
(2002) terminology, they can act as facilitators, confusers, frustraters and delayers.  
Regarding the nature of the change leader, it is useful to ascertain whether the leader is 
considered a part of the organisation, a hybrid leader (i.e., holding both financial, accounting, 
production and procedures knowledge); or has deciding and authoritative power over the agents 
subject to change. The examination of several MA change cases sheds light on a reoccurring 
aspect: whenever the change leader is recruited outside the company, more effort is required to 
conquer legitimacy. Leaders had to prove their competences, build a relationship of trust and 
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impose their authority and decision-making power. The literature acknowledges that power can 
be used ‘to shape or influence an actor's perceptions and preferences, making them accept a 
new status quo’ (Alsharari 2015, p. 489). Agents are, then, convinced that change is necessary, 
‘desirable, rational, and legitimate’ (Hardy, 1996 in Alsharari 2015, p. 489)  
At that point, an assessment is carried out to check whether the agents subject to change 
recognise the need for it and whether they trust the change designers and leaders' competences. 
As stated in Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007, p 20), ‘trust and control are intertwined forces that 
can facilitate an MA change implementation’. Regarding the nature of the accounting 
change, there are four primary considerations: Does it challenge the prevailing ways of thinking 
and doing things? Was the organisation subject to a diagnosis before the introduction of a new 
MAP? Were the tool designers close to operations? Were the system's users involved in the 
conception of the new MAP? 
The case portrayed by Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) reveals the impact of the 
abovementioned factors. Two objectives were set up within a Modernisation Project. The first, 
concerning service performance, was compatible with those of prevailing service-oriented 
institutions. It was accepted as legitimate. In contrast, the second, related to cost reduction and 
financial accountability, was not aligned with existing routines and resulted in resistance and 
inertia toward the introduction of new rules. They were not fully compatible with the prevalent 
ones, causing change agents to become reluctant (Busco et al. 2006 in Van der Steen, 2009). 
Moreover, the authors suggest that, if the accountants (i.e., the change leaders) had 
demonstrated their trustworthiness to the operations managers, it would have been possible to 
find a middle ground between the need for improved services and the reduction of costs. On the 
contrary, the accountants in question were considered outsiders with lack of operational 
knowledge and experience, failing to create bonds and acting, instead, as frustraters. Moreover, 
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operational managers had little involvement in the conception of the new MAPs, which added 
to the distrust and tension. This example affirms trust as a facilitator of change. 
Conversely, a case reported by Munir et al. (2013) is an example of a change leader whose 
role was crucial in overcoming resistance against a new Performance Measurement System 
(PMS) in a bank. Despite being an outsider, he created the acceptance and momentum for 
change. Line-managers were involved in the change design from the start through the exchange 
of ideas in formal and informal meetings. Indeed, operational managers rose as change leaders 
thanks to their active participation. Additionally, there was a considerable amount of time spent 
on a diagnosis analysis, guaranteeing that the new PMS would fit the bank's needs. Similarly, 
in the Cobb et al. (1995) case, accountants were keen to involve managers and explain the new 
reports and new MAP to be rolled out to the operational divisions. In this sense, the accountants 
acted as facilitators. 
4.3.2 The Second Step: Revision/Reproduction and Institutionalisation 
 The new MAP's implementation, training, technical support, task and workload assignment 
play a crucial role in its routinisation and consequent institutionalisation. 
Once the agents have participated in the first step–internalising the rules and recognising the 
reasons to follow them in their day-to-day activity–, it is important to evaluate the new tools' 
functionality (See Cobb et al., 1995; Kasurinen, 2002; Robalo, 2014). If the new system and 
techniques are not fully integrated and operational, frustration can arise among users with 
consequent abandonment of their use.  Furthermore, if training and technical support are not 
adequately given to agents, the success of the new system could also be jeopardised. In cases 
where task reassignment took place, two aspects will require attention: retaining organisational 
knowledge, and adequately allocating the workload. Structural rearrangements, responsibility 
reassignment and new means of communication lead to 'inevitable organisational confusion' 
(Vaivio, 1999, p 41). 
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Munir et al. (2013) report one case that illustrates these challenges. In it, branch and unit 
managers were required to collect monthly performance data, which was partly calculated and 
entered manually into in-house software. The same software was used to support the PMS. It 
was too slow and made the process of updating data tedious to users. Similarly, in the Cobb et 
al. (1995) case, despite the progress made in the first step of the change process, several planned 
changes were delayed or did not happen. The change leaders' inability to make the MAP fully 
operational was due to disruptive interferences in the form of new information requirements, 
restructuring of the financial department with loss of organisational knowledge, and the 
increasing number of priorities and workload. These barriers caused the ABC implementation 
to fail. The same situation was found in the case reported by Robalo (2014). The Portuguese 
postal services company completed the preliminary diagnosis and first step in MA change with 
success. However, the changes implied 'very time-consuming tasks' that clashed with day-to-
day activities. This, and to the change leader's reluctance to recruit more human resources, 
added difficulty to the adoption of the new MAPs. Hence, the new MAPs remained at the initial 
stage of the institutionalisation process, albeit, with the potential to take the next step.  
The hybrid framework is, thus, a complete tool that allows a holistic and in-depth analysis of 
and MA change. With a simple design and clear-cut approach, one can easily proceed to 
diagnose an organisation, understand whether its features could facilitate a change process and, 
then, evaluate how the company would behave in response to the fundamental conditions for a 
successful MA change. It is, therefore, the best analytical tool to examine the case at hand, as 
follows in sections below. 
5. Case Study 
This is a study of the Portuguese chemical industry company. The company started as a 
multinational firm and, since 1990, its shareholder structure has gone through five distinct 
phases–the first two lasting ten years. At the start, the main shareholder was a large German 
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chemical company, and then, the latter was acquired by a Swiss financial company. During this 
period, there was always a minority Portuguese shareholder. At the beginning of the 
millennium, this minority holder acquired the whole business, making it a family-run enterprise. 
This ownership lasted 20 years (third phase) until the company was acquired by an American 
multinational (fourth phase). Lastly, after just one year, the latter was acquired by an English 
multinational (fifth and last phase). 
Besides the evolution of the shareholder structure, external factors also caused the business 
to adjust. Two economic crises led to a drastic reduction in the Portuguese market, and the 
company had no alternative but to become an exporter. This change entailed the introduction 
of new key performance indicators (KPIs) for monitorisation, such as margins per market and 
unit transport costs. It is worth noting that the growing concern with environmental 
sustainability also meant tighter controls over resource consumption and waste production. 
 5.1 Ownership Evolution 
The Environment & Quality (E&Q) Manager, who has worked for the company since 1991, 
said that, in the 1990s, 'they were not used to measure many production values or set many 
objectives. The prevailing norms did not even include many KPIs.' Therefore, in the two earliest 
phases, the change strategies receive little MA information, relying mostly on the traditional 
financial MA practices, such as budgets, sales and investment plans, product costing and timely 
account closure. Of course, the increasing focus on financial performance under the Swiss 
ownership, during the second phase, implied a tighter control of finances. That meant that, even 
without an extensive change in MAPs, the new vision challenged the organisational taken-for-
granted ways of working. 
Even so, the management board assumed a generally receptive and cohesive position without 
resistance to those new ideas. As the plant manager said: 'As managers, we had "to absorb" the 
guidelines of the parent company.' Concerns about investment, equipment maintenance and 
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research were put on hold, which ended up threatening the business continuity. Not surprisingly, 
this threat materialised after five years in the sale of the business, not only in Portugal but in all 
European sites. 
The transition to a family-run business in 2002 (third phase) coincided with the launch of ISO 
9001: 2000 (the year 2000 update of an international quality management system standard), 
bringing about a significant change. Firstly, there was a drastic cut in decision-making lead-
time and a greater involvement of management staff. Additionally, thanks to the new CEO's 
long experience as chairman of several financial companies, the rigour of the financial metrics 
was kept. Moreover, as the E&Q manager referred, with ISO 9001: 2000, organisations started 
to include goals and targets in their MAPs. At the time, the goals and targets were for areas, 
such as product quality, defective products, and complaints. Later, with the increase of 
environmental legislation, the company established a new set of KPIs and limits in that area. 
In addition, the IT system (i.e., the Enterprise Resource Planning, SAP) used under the 
previous ownerships was kept the same to ensure that control and accuracy in procedures were 
maintained. Keeping it was then taken as a priority, leading to a larger initial investment as well 
as maintenance costs related to the required licenses and upgrades. Still in the third phase, closer 
to the following sale, conflicts began to emerge. Most notably, the diverging interests of the 
increasing number of family shareholders. Decision-making got more fastidious, especially 
regarding investment. Since the third phase presented an excellent business performance, the 
company attracted several interested buyers (see Appendix H). 
In 2018, the American ownership took over (fourth stage), and their first step was to 
homogenise practice in all branches. However, according to the interviewed plant manager, it 
failed to analyse the existing structure. In retrospective, it is clear that, at that time, the 
shareholders' main goal was to present good financial and stock market results for the best 
possible sale. This pressure on financial performance, particularly on ratios, such as the working 
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capital, meant that certain practices, like raw material stock management and price flexibility, 
could no longer stay in place.  
In less than two years, the company entered the fifth stage: English ownership. The English 
mother-company has a record of mergers and acquisitions, meaning it was not used to building 
units from scratch, but rather to acquire them across the world. The multinational has been 
surveying practice from all its sites: very different computer systems, management and sales 
practices, quality and safety perceptions. To deal with this amalgam of practices, the mother-
company had to develop a global management model with the goal of consolidating a common 
knowledge– ‘the brand's way.' This model contemplates two main areas: Manufacturing 
Excellence (MANEX), and Safety, Health and Security (SHE). Its implementation in the 
Portuguese branch began immediately after the acquisition with the homogenisation and 
standardisation of procedures. 
When comparing the fifth stage to the third, the E&Q Manager says that, as far as KPIs, the 
concept remains almost the same. She claims the main difference is that both the fourth and 
fifth mother-companies were listed on the stock market. This is corroborated by the Engineering 
and Maintenance (E&M) Manager: 'the introduction of new KPIs and metrics is not innocent. 
There is an obligation to collect data and present it to the market and those who finance the 
company.' Hence, this multinational is setting the same metrics to run its business and 
homogenise practice and processes across 25 sites worldwide. 
5.2 Change Implementation 
Since the last ownership transition, the management model integration included a self-
diagnosis (SAQ) as its first step. At this stage, those responsible for the model and its designers 
guide the management board in their self-assessment, asking questions to ensure an accurate 
company evaluation. Based on the responses, the company is awarded gold, silver or bronze 
status. The goal is to 'look at where they are to develop a strategy.' 
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Nevertheless, this SAQ took place under extraordinary conditions: the COVID-19 pandemic. 
All its processes were carried out online, rather than occurring on site. For the E&Q and E&M 
managers, these restrictions hindered the process as the scheduled meetings never happened. 
The strategy, based on the diagnosis, developed into a meaningful plan for the team, with 
subsequent execution. Afterwards, it will be resubmitted for a new diagnosis and strategy. 
During this continuous process, the results delivered are monitored and improved for extra 
value. Several MA tools allow the continuity of this process and, consequently, the achievement 
of strategic goals (see Appendix I). A change management software is also available to ensure 
that change and its consequences, in all dimensions (i.e., organisational, equipment, process, 
procedures), is accounted for. 
5.3 Repercussions 
When the company was 100% Portuguese, the decision-making was much faster. Decisions 
that were previously in the hands of the Plant Manager are now subject to the approval of the 
division's vice-president. The conception of an annual budget, for instance, was previously a 
bottom-up process; it is, now, prepared in a centralised, top-down way.  
At other stages, many employees assumed dual functions, working in different areas, because 
one job did not take an entire workday, and it was not possible to hire two different people. As 
a multinational, this coexistence of functions is made difficult for two main reasons: the volume 
of international requests and the long decision-making lead-time (decisions were previously 
coordinated with other tasks and that is no longer possible). The Plant and E&Q Managers feel 
the last two multinational owners demonstrate reluctance in analysing this issue because they 
cannot see why there should be a barrier to change in the first place. On the other hand, when 
asked about whether these structural changes had an impact on decision power, autonomy, and 
workload, the E&M Manager shows a slightly different perspective. He said he had much 
autonomy to run their divisions. Now, he is on the fourth or fifth line of decision-making (see 
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Appendix J). He went on to say that the change may have been felt differently by some of his 
peers, namely the Plant Manager. The latter used to belong to the Executive Board and have a 
say in all decisions. He and now is 'only in charge of the operations.' The E&M manager agrees 
that there are more pressure and work, but he sees it as a consequence of a centralised 
management 'that is inevitable when running many branches.' 
Yet, the company is at an early stage of the change implementation, and it is not perfectly 
integrated. This is another barrier to the delivery on the parent company's requests for 
information. The number of required KPIs is high, and often the variables used to calculate 
them are not readily available. Currently, there is more than one kind of software in use, leading 
to confusion and parallel reporting. All three respondents corroborated that situation, which is 
also easily verifiable in the literature (Munir et al., 2013; Kasurinen, 2002; Cobb et al., 1995; 
Robalo, 2014). The three managers share the feeling that when all the IT systems are integrated, 
and everyone has access to data and results, the analysis and feedback will flow. 
In essence, the values and taken-for-granted practices in the fifth stage are not too different 
from those of the third and fourth stage, (see Appendix K). In other words, there has been little 
organisational resistance. A good example of that, said the Plant Manager, was the SHE 
programme training session, where there was 'a very positive spirit with everyone wanting to 
improve our safety ratios.' Still, some respondents reported acceptance discrepancy in certain 
divisions. According to the respondents, salespeople resisted the introduction of SHE practices, 
as they saw it as a threat to the company's output and, consequently, to the success of their sales.  
 5.4 Discussion 
Throughout the fifth stage, the MAP change motivators were the external: changes in 
ownership, unstable economic and market conditions, and the rise of stricter environmental 
regulation. In fact, the catalyst for the last MAP rearrangement was the change in ownership. 
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Moreover, as both the E&Q and E&M Managers stress, being quoted on in the stock market 
also exerts more pressure on the need to collect data to show shareholders.   
Regarding the company's predisposition to succeed in the remainder of the MA change, the 
company has a successful track record of significant changes throughout its history. Besides, 
the chemical industry itself demands constant compliance with changing and strict directives. 
Furthermore, the management board has been the same through all these transitions, and it has 
always adopted a receptive posture, without resistance. Lastly, the company has shown a culture 
of accountability since the beginning, and it did not wane during the third (family-run) phase. 
This background allowed it to adjust constantly to changing external requirements. New, 
stricter standards were never a problem; it was always a matter of adjustment to the new 
prevailing mindset (i.e., evolutionary change). 
Concerning the process of change, because the Management Board was kept, the change 
leaders were company insiders. They are, therefore, at an advantage, unlike outsider change 
leaders mentioned in the case studies reviewed above, who had to go the extra mile to attain 
legitimacy, power, and trust. Besides their insider status, the Plant and E&Q Managers–the 
main change leaders– are also what is known in the field as ‘hybrid managers’ (managers who 
have operational experience), that is, engineers with extensive financial knowledge. By 
working for the company since practically the beginning, they have earned decision power, 
authority and trust in their competences among the employees. There was no need to gain 
legitimacy or trust. 
Regarding the agents subject to change, the employees, from management to the shop floor, 
are used to comply with new requirements that emerge from both changing ownerships and 
other external forces. Notwithstanding, the MA change is not 100% consensual. One issue 
raised by the Plant Manager was that the sales department expressed some discomfort toward 
the new practices and how they could affect their job performance. Similarly, the E&M 
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manager, when asked about losing decision power over his division, acknowledged the loss of 
autonomy but denied any feeling of loss or demotivation. He does, however, lift the veil about 
other staff members, namely the Plant Manager. He says his peer is likely to have taken the 
change harder, as he was more involved in the business before and, now, is 'only in charge of 
the operations.' This is an indication of potentially camouflaged discontent, which must be 
addressed by an effective and persuasive communication from the parent company to ensure 
that all staff members are comfortable with their new positions. Otherwise, the discontent can 
become a hindrance. 
Regarding the nature of the accounting change, this MA's last change matches the prevailing 
ways of thinking and doing things. Unfavourably, the tool designers were not close to the 
company's operations and were not involved in the conception of the new MAP. As stated, an 
MA change occurs through an integration process into an already established programme. Since 
the plan is to homogenise practice across business sites, the focus of the change process was on 
adapting to already-established rules, practices, and systems. Nonetheless, this aspect was 
supposed to be mitigated through a pre-diagnosis, which, as explained above, was compromised 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Even so, its goal was partly met, as the abovementioned three 
dimensions indicate that the company would be able to do reasonably well in the encoding and 
enacting of the new MAP. 
As to the drivers of reproduction and institutionalisation, the MANEX and SHE 
programmes are well-documented, and established systems; all their stages are planned and 
scheduled, including the training sessions. However, they exhibit technical failures, which are 
corrected only when reported by the branches. As noted, this is a problem because the new 
reporting systems are not yet fully integrated. In addition, the workload and task reassignment 
were not perceived as being adequately done by the three managers. They alerted to the 
potential loss of expertise and inappropriate allocation of tasks, i.e., disregarding the extra 
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workload implied. In other words, importing an idea is not enough to put it in place. When an 
employee's responsibilities are to be changed, it is essential to evaluate their workload and 
capacity to take on the new functions. Ineffective integration and inadequate task allocation can 
act as MA change frustraters and delayers (Kasurinen, 2002; Robalo, 2014). Therefore, these 
issues must be carefully and closely considered to ensure that this step in MA change 
implementation is effectively completed. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper reconceptualised MA change drawing from several theories and an extensive case 
study review. A hybrid framework was set up, considering the various dimensions that tend to 
exert an influence on the process. A case study was conducted to enrich the research, adding 
evidence on the theoretical framework, which, in turn, guided its analysis. Among several 
insights, the most relevant was that companies fail to implement their MA changes, mainly in 
the second step of the process. The chief reasons for that are failures in the integration of MA 
systems in the operations. Agents may be receptive to embrace and reproduce new procedures, 
but lose motivation when facing the difficulty of incorporating the MA change in day-to-day 
activities. The selected case revealed the rising importance of MA in translating abstract 
strategies into meaningful, quantifiable, and measurable goals–both financial and non-
financial–and linking them to specific targets monitored through performance indicators 
(KPIs). As highlighted, throughout the various acquisitions and new external requirements, the 
company increased its focus on performance evaluation, monitoring and control. Beyond 
presenting good business performance results, it is crucial to identify the operational value gaps 
where the company can do better. 
This study is not without its limitations. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, visiting the company 
was not viable. The company's historical background was reconstructed based on documents 
and interviews with managers, relying on their memory and perception. Not only that but, as 
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widely discussed in information systems literature, defining and measuring the success of an 
MA change is a difficult task, as it can range from improving system quality to organisational 
impact (Siti-Nabiha et al., 2005). Lastly, the case study only covers the initial stage of change, 
requiring further research. Thus, the study of cases over long periods with the possibility of 
visiting the company at hand is welcome. That research would allow a deeper understanding of 
the dynamics of an integration process and the conceptualised framework's validity. 
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8. List of Abbreviations 
 
ABC Activity- Based Costing  
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
E&M Engineering and Maintenance 
E&Q Environmental and Quality 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
IT Information Technology 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
MA Management Accounting 
MANEX Manufacturing Excellence 
MAP Management Accounting Practice 
NIE New Institutional Economics  
NIS New Institutional Sociology  
OIE Old Institutional Economics  
PMS Performance Measurement Systems 
SAP Systems Applications and Products  in Data Processing 
SAQ Self-Assessment Questionnaire 








































Analysis of Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007 
 
Title Author Industry/sector Accounting change Accounting tool 
The Role of 
Accounting and 







• To increase the monitoring and controlling 
of the behaviour of operations managers, 
especially at the State level; 
• Accountants become involved in the 
approval of overtime costs, the verification of 
additional budget requests; and the 
submission of monthly variance analysis 
reports. 
• New budgeting System; 
• Newly created roles  for 
accountants regarding a 
Modernisation project; 
• The recruitment of new 
accounting graduates; 
• New clear floor targets and work 
productivity targets; 
 





Problems / Resistance 
• To secure greater (financial) 
accountability. 
• Cost-efficiency in the provision of core 
services. 
• Greater financial efficiency in the public 
sector. 
• To instil a greater awareness of costs 
within operations, internal coordination 
mechanism within a hierarchical system of 
accountability. 
• To achieve reliable and consistent service 
performance. 
• Change of ownership: the belief 
that the public sector is inefficient 
and only private sector MA 
techniques will enable the company 
to be 'self-financing, efficient and 
profitable.' 
 
• Institutional pressures of both 








• Loose coupling of budgets 
(the variances ended up not 
being reported)  
• Problems in the relations of 
trust between the accountants 
and the operating managers.  
• The accounting controls 
reduced the autonomy of the 
operations managers and gave 
them the impression that they 
were not to be trusted; 
 
Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
 
• Contradictions between the requirements of improved service levels and 
the control of costs. 
• It challenged the prevailing ways of doing things. 
•  Contradictory institutional pressures 
• Financial literacy too low to accept the new accounting rules as intended. 
• State accountants were new graduates meaning  gaps in seniority, work 
experience, age, and educational background 
between the two professional groups.  
• Accountants do not have operations experience and knowledge. 
•  State accountants lacked power over decision-making and meanings, 
which, Burns (2000) argued, are important for implementing accounting 
change. Accountants prepared budgets in a top-down incremental fashion 
without Op managers considerations about the amounts --> centralised. 
• Lack of mutual trust in each other's competences. 
• Allocation of financial resources and design of financial procedures were 
made at a distance failing to recognise local problems and operational 
needs. 
• Interest, power, and trust were intertwined with issues of control and 
resistance; Op managers wanted to keep 'things as they are.' 'They think 
that the operational numbers are enough to manage.' 
• 'Accounting Procedures impede fast decisions.' 
• The first objective, 
concerning service 
performance, was 
compatible with the 
prevailing service-
oriented institutions 
and hence was 
accepted as quite 
legitimate. 
 
• The clear floor 
targets had a far-
reaching impact, 
being the daily much 
achieve; 
• The clear floor 
targets reflected the 
operational managers' 
concerns and were 
aligned with what 
they perceived as 
important. 'What is 
mandatory for the 
operations is a clear 






increment in the 
workforce. 
• The intended 
purpose of the 
budgets introduced 
into PSP (i.e., to 
instil a greater 
awareness of costs 
within operations) 













Analysis of Munir et al., 2013 
 
 











• More effective control systems in the 
current dynamic business environment. 
 
• Selection of performance 
measures for key business operations and 
management activities. 
• Performance Measurement System (PMS) --> 
KPIS system 
- new performance measurement process: 
- an increase in the nature and types of performance 
measures. 
-  the introduction of a branch profitability report. 
 

























• Uncertain economic conditions, 
increasing competition, and 
pressure from stakeholders. 
• Financial losses experienced, 
major regulatory changes, and the 
appointment of a new board of 
directors and president. 
 • Increased competition affected 
Anonbank's market share and 
profitability and made it difficult 
for Anonbank to compete with its 
existing management structure 
and PMS, which was largely 
bureaucratic and inefficient.  
• Many regulatory and 
institutional changes between 
1997 and 2007 as a result of 







 • New 
group of 
heads  










• Branch and Unit managers were confused about the way in 
which the system would affect their bonuses and promotions. 
• Many initiatives were being introduced too rapidly, thereby 
placing undue pressure on them to adapt to different concepts in a 
very short time. 
• Inability to understand the reasons for the change.  
• Past several change initiatives went wrong with subsequent 
abandonment, which made employees lose confidence in any 
changes.  
• The need to collect performance data monthly and some of 
these data were produced manually, which was time-consuming 
and cumbersome. 
• The software used to support the PMS was too slow. The time 
required to show the PMS on a computer screen physically made 
the process of keeping PMS data up to date tedious. Exacerbating 
this situation, a large share of the data still had to be calculated 
and entered manually into the spreadsheets. These spreadsheets, 
in a stand-alone software application, were maintained 
independently by 
the business units to manage clusters of data from different 
processes. 
 
Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
• Confusers: BUs' goals in conflict 
with those of the bank, employees' 
past experience and different views 
on PMS change; Uncertainty about 
the role of PMS. 
 
• Frustraters: More experienced 
employees saw no benefits in 
changing to a new system; they were 
more comfortable with the old system 
and who had difficulties dealing with 
technical aspects of the new PMS 
•  
• Delayers: Computerisation of the 
PMS Integration of system of 
business units; Employees' behaviour 
and attitude towards new PMS 
Inadequate communication 
Ended it up with 
the complete 
automation and 




system instead of 
Excel 
spreadsheets 
• Motivators Uncertain economic conditions; Increased 
competition; Interference from the government and staff 
union; Pressure to improve performance and corporate image. 
• Catalysts Financial sector reforms 
High non-performing loans in the banking sector; Financial 
losses of the bank; Changed regulatory framework 
New Board of directors and bank president. 
• Facilitators: Management Committee meetings 
Staff training; Technological support; Taskforce 
Consultant; Momentum; Changing organisational and field 
structure; Changes in the strategic planning process; Leaders 
President; New group heads: top management communicated 
their expectations very effectively in establishing the need for 
change from the beginning. They created commitment of the 
employees for the new performance measurement system;  
they spent time and effort developing the new PMS system to 
fit Anonbank's needs; Discussion improvements in the 
integration of the PMS with employees. 
Well implemented 
due to subsequent 
changes: complete 
automation and 








Analysis of Kasurinen, 2002 
 
 














• Clarifying and updating the business unit strategy.   
• Communicating strategies to everyone in the unit.  
• Following up strategic goals. 










Problems / Resistance 
The existing control system 
focused mostly on financial 
measures. Since the case unit 
was doing financially well, 
the signs of potential 
problems related to the 
maturity of products would 
appear only after the existing 
'cash cows' had turned into 
'dogs' (e.g. Porter, 1980, p. 
362). Accordingly, the 
balanced scorecard project 
can be considered one way to 
increase future orientation in 
the case unit 
The strategic management 
style in the organisation was 
strongly based on financial 
control (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987), and 
diagnostic measurement 
(Simons, 1995) played a 
significant role in the 
management process. 
However, a new division 
general manager, who had 
been appointed in 1995, had 
strongly emphasised the 









• The BU management was not able to deliver clear 
strategic signals to the employees, and reaching the 
project's goals (such as communicating strategies to 
everyone in the unit) became difficult. 
• The existing organisational culture, since the 
measurement was considered quite natural in an 
engineering context, the balanced scorecard was regarded 
as a tool combining financial and non-financial measures, 
not measures and strategy. This reduced the strategic 
focus of the project. The financial success of the case 
business unit also seemed to limit the motivation to make 
the strategies more specific; Complex project 
environment with lack of coordination between various 
projects, such as the uniform operative indicator system; 
resignation of the divisional general managers shortly 
before the implementation of the created BS ---> 
reduction of motivation in the unit to implement it:" 
 
Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
• Confusers: Uncertainty about 
the project's future role in the 
organisation; Different views on 
change.   
• Frustraters:  •Existing 
reporting systems; Organisational 
cultural.  
• Delayers: In the balanced 
scorecard context, e.g. lack of 
clear-cut strategies; Inadequate 
information systems 
Furthermore, the division and 
business unit managers seemed to 
be interested in implementing a 
tool, which could help in the 
communication of the defined 
strategies, and increase the focus 
within performance measurement; 
the power of divisional manager 
over business unit managers; 
 
Furthermore, the division and business 
unit managers seemed to be interested 
in implementing a tool, which could 
help in the communication of the 
defined strategies, and increase the 
focus within performance 
measurement.; the power of divisional 
manager over business unit managers; 
Accordingly, the decision to drop 
the project a month later was not 
surprising. The final straw for the 
decision was the organisation 
change which was to take place 
in the following January. In this 
change, some strategic business 
units (including the case unit) 
would be combined, and the 










Accounting change Accounting tool 
Management 
accounting 













Both accountants and managers agreed that a major change during the 
period of this case study was the increased level of discussions and great 
informal contracts between managers and management accountants. 
Changes such as the new cost allocation methodology, VFM exercise, new 
cost reports, competitive benchmarking and more participative budgeting 
process all involved greater contact between managers and management 
accountants. In addition, the man accountants were keen to explain both the 
format of new reports and the monthly details to the managers. Thus, the 
boundary of the MAP expanded out of the office and into the operational 
areas of the division 
Several MA techniques and 
Systems: new cost 
allocation methodology, 
value for money exercise, 
new cost reports, 
competitive benchmarking 









Problems / Resistance 
• To increase monitoring of 
new complex financial 
products: foreign exchange 
and derivative products such 
as forwards and options. 
 
- Pressures such as new competitors; developments 
in information technology; bad debt experience, 
reducing profit margins and the introduction of 
new products) initiated the changes in management 
accounting systems. Environmental pressures were 
the primary reasons for the change. Thus, we have 
a picture of an organisation under pressure from its 
environment with a MAP which did not match the 
changing information needs of management. this 
mismatch between the MAP and its environment 
created a tension, a pressure, for change -a 








• New board 
members 






• Loss of certain individuals. 
• Many interferences in the 
conception of MAP 
 




• Loss of five qualified accountants between 1989 
and 1993: four of them moved to other positions 
within the bank. 
• Loss of local knowledge and expertise which 
affected the development of MAP and in 
particular changes in reports for the managers. 
• The number of priorities increased between 
1990 and 1993: as new priorities were identified, 
developments which had previously been near 
the top for the list of priorities moved back down 
this list. However, these old priorities remained 
and were not dropped and indeed were usually 
reactivated later (such as possibly ABC in 1994), 
For the accountants, this constant change of 
priorities was a disruptive interference in terms of 
bringing new developments in the MAP to 
fruition so that managers could use the resulting 
information 
 
During our interviews with managers, 
a change in attitude towards the 
accountants was noticed. By 1993, 
the managers accepted that the 
accountants could provide them with 
useful information. This continuing 
dialogue between managers and 
accountants and the much great 
informal contact between managers 
and accountants were important 
features of the change success; within 
the division, the non-banking 
background of the financial controller 
influenced the development of the 
MAP and in particular the reporting 
system; Accountants were keen to 
explain both format and the month 
details of new reports; Investment in 
back-office systems  
• Increased 




pressure on margins 
and new board 
members; new CFO 
and Divisional 
Financial controller 
are catalysts and 
accounting staff and 
the support they 
gave are the 
facilitators. 
 
The output of the MAP has 
changed from one very limited 
report to a range of reports aimed 
at giving all levels of 
management the information 
they need to manage their area of 
responsibility. In addition, there 
is much more face-to-face 
contact between the human 
elements of the MAP and 
managers - the boundary of MAP 
has expanded.  However, the 
process of change has not been 
smooth and linear; many planned 
changes were either delayed or 
did not happen due mainly to 
changing in priorities; Failure of 





Analysis of Busco, et al., 2007 
Title Author Industry/ sector Accounting change Accounting tool 
Management Accounting 
Issues in interpreting its 
nature and change 
 
Busco et al., 2007 
 
Middle East Gas and Oil 
Company  
 
Translating strategy into action, 
making companies strategy 
focuses and enabling alignment 
and integration  
Balanced Scorecard 
within SAP's platform 
 
 
Main goal Drivers of change Subject of change Subject to change Problems / Resistance 
To monitor the achievement of strategic 
goals: 
• Transform Corporate Performance; 
• Optimise the Corporate Portfolio; 
• Maximise Revenues by capturing Oil 
Growth opportunities;  
• Protect the future Market for Oil;  
• Leverage the Oil and Gas Resources to 
expand the Nacional Economy; 
• Prepare the Workforce for the future. 
• Greater integration 
The government 
called companies to 
take some action to 
improve the local 
economy and 
increase the revenue 









• Even at the end of the process of 
deployment, the BSC failed to 
achieve what it was supposed to 
deliver. i.e., a greater integration; 
• Lack of leadership: they should 
have fostered support and 
commitment to change through 
effective communication; 'dealing 
with resistance is 50% of my time.' 
 
Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
• Operation managers were concerned 
about whether the change was good or 
should be resisted. Not sure if the proposed 
new technical solution arose in a transitory 
fashion or as a reflection of actual 
organisational needs; 
• Perceived as potentially disrupting for 
existing working practices; 
• The impression that were more important 
and valuable things to care about; 
• Several managers could not fully explain 
their origins and reasons for 
implementation; 
• Absent in practice; 
• BSC was imposed without taking into 
account the existing organisational culture 
and working practices. 
 
 
• the BSC was constantly 
referred to and evoked but 
always absent, never achieved 
and always in the making --> 
paradox. The ability of BSC to 
be in present n working 
relationships, although absent in 
practice; 
• Accountants became business 
partners and experts providing 
innovative financial expertise 
rather than preparing boring 
budget figures, (..) they became 
a community made of hybrid 
leaders 
• Introduction of full cost 
reporting project with new 
current cost sheets; 
 
• Café 2004 was a meeting that 
included 680 out of 8650 employees 
of Eng. and operations services to 
stimulate an internal debate; 
• Calendars, diaries, posters were part 
of the means used diffuse the idea of 
MEGOC as strategy focused 
organisation; 
• It was not forced, but the diffusion 
was in a visually and methodological 
engaging manner; 
• BSC was a system that allows a 
better translation of operational 
achievement into bottom-line results 
 
It was not possible to build 
a corporate-wide scorecard. 
Instead, seven different 
divisions were scored. 
They take their own actions 
and initiatives in line with 







Analysis of Robalo, 2014 
Title Author Industry/ sector Accounting change Accounting tool 
Explanations for the gap 
between management 
accounting rules and 





service of Portugal 
 
Implementation of a IS in order to increase the 
accountability of the organisational areas, particularly 
focusing on the business areas, through the introduction 
of negotiated internal transfer prices. Additionally, the 
PCO implemented the KPI based on the balanced 
scorecard rationale 
• Income Statements 









Problems / Resistance 
• IS 'will provide monthly income 
statements by organisational area 
even for the lower levels of the 
organisational structure, statements 
which will include an 
internal transfer pricing model;' 
•KPI 'will provide a set of key 
performance indicators by 
organisational area every month, so 
this will allow the Board to monitor 
the implementation of the strategic 
goals of Post.' 
 
• Increasing competition;  
• Ongoing process of 
deregulation as a 
consequence of the 
European Community 
opening up postal services 
to competition; 
• New technologies, 
because new forms of 
communication such as 
email and the Internet 













• Information was produced once a year instead 
of every month (initial target); 
• Managers did not acknowledge MA tools as 
appropriate innovations to run their daily 
activities. 
• Organisational restructuration: no coherence 
between the assessed organisational areas and the 
new ones. 
• Lack of enthusiasm from the operational 
managers. 
 
Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
• The new tools were not valued by 
the operational managers. 
• They acknowledge the 
importance of the information, but 
they too needed to have 
access to it frequently to make 
timely decisions to change the 
course of action. 
• New organisational structure 
implies new information 
requirements and adjustments, 
which is time-consuming. 
• Lack of human resources: number 
and skills: 
• Lack of pressure from both the 
Board and the op managers. 
• Operational managers did not 
resist to the introduction of MA 
innovations. Even not strongly 
desiring them, they saw the IS and 
KPI as something whose 
usefulness they could learn more 
about in the future, but as not 
something that assisted them in 
managing their day-to-day 
activities. 
 
• Lack of pressure was observed in 
both the Board and operational 
managers. It is justified on the grounds 
of trust. The Board trusted the PCO 
managers and had thus not pressured 
them to provide the information on a 
routine monthly basis. Of course, there 
were also interpersonal trust relations 
between the PCO managers and the 
members of the Board, particularly 
between the head of the PCO and the 
chair of the Board. They had known 
each other for over a decade. The 
invitation, in 1995, for her to become 
the (still) head of the PCO came from 
the very same chairman. 
The PCO implemented the IS 
and KPI in Post. However, 
these management accounting 
innovations did not achieve an 
acceptable level of stability in 
order to guarantee the regular 
production of monthly 
information as planned and 
desired. There was a gap 







Analysis of Busco et al., 2011 










Oil and gas industry  
 
 
• The company became immersed in a 
process designed to integrate it within the 
global ALPHA (acquirer) company. The 
process focused on restructuring its 
management systems. The process of 
change has been deep and intense, affecting 
every aspect of the business: 
• the reengineering of the previously or 
PMS accountability; 
•Implementation of a new measurement-
based quality programme, six sigma. 
 
Performance measurement 
and control, both in financial 
and non-financial terms; 
• Six sigma tools;  
• Budgets  
 
 
Main goal Drivers of change Subject of change Subject to change 
Problems / 
Resistance 
• To produce numbers and an 




Although beta had a sound profits 
record, alpha analysts believed there 
was room to improve 
 
• ALPHA Leaders 
and American 
trainers; 
• External Italian 
researchers and 
professionals invited  
 
• Engineers and 
project managers 





Reasons for resistance  Successful Reasons for success Final status 
*Cultural shift 
 
• Expression of extensive 
commitment to the slogans and 
rhetoric of ALPHA leaders; the 
rhetoric of ALPAH's leaders, the 
CEO and top managers reached 
everyone in the company, 
managers and workers, 
accountants and engineers. They 
may agree or disagree, but they 
all know the ALPHA way to do 
the job and also, they will be 
responsible for their own 
activities; 
• With the new structure, reports, 
data, information, charts flow 
rapidly around the company in 
response to pressure to produce 
numbers, and good numbers 
every three months; 
The need for change was 
recognised at all levs; new credo 
 
 
• Number of training courses such as finance for 
non-financial managers; Understanding financial 
fundamentals; the financial benefits of six sigma 
and controllership; 
• Exploratory meeting and group discussions with 
engineers and project managers from several BETA 
divisions; 
• Well done restructuring of accounting and finance 
departments, which included a decentralised task 
force within each division, who was responsible for 
budgeting and cost control for its projects; 
• Process of change reinforced by the development 
of an integrated information system: intranet and 
possibility to have data online allow to save time 
when computing data;  
• Cognitive redefinition of key concepts 
• the power of AL+HA's communication system 
and the resources invested --< "communication and 
training were central". CEO'S statements 
charismatic leadership with strong statements; 
•"The majority were yes-men mushroomed" 
 





Analysis of Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005 
Title Author Industry/ sector Accounting change 
Accounting 
tool 
Stability and change: an 











Introduction of VBM - Value-based Management by the 
parent company. The core of VBM was a performance 
evaluation system which required managers to formulate 
KPIs.  





Subject of change Subject to change Problems / Resistance 
• The goal was to enhance MA control 
and to give operations a more strategic 
orientation aimed at value 
maximisation. The K was used for both 
managing director and parent company 
use: 
• VBM was seen as a tool to determine 
whether the company's activities were 
being undertaken in a value-adding 
manner. Additionally, they argued that 
economic-based earnings 
measurements could be used as a proxy 
for an open market valuation of NOC, 
which was not publicly quoted. 
• The need to secure legitimacy and 




• Western consulting firm 
appointed to undertake a 
corporate review of the 
company's long-term direction; 
• The GM Finance was the 
custodian of the VBM System; 
• Coordination with the chief 
accountant and the Production 
Planning Manager; 
• Individual Managers   
 
Operational Managers 
• Within Eagle there did not 
seem to be any recognition of 
a need to change its systems 
of accountability and 
performance evaluation, at 
least not in this way; 
 




• VBM's potential impact in Eagle could have been quite 
revolutionary; VBM and KPIs were designed to change the 
way in which decision-making is undertaken in Eagle and 
to facilitate other changes, including the way managers 
think about their activities.  
• Conflict with existing institutions within Eagle which 
were predominantly production orientation; the norms and 
values, and the financially oriented ways of thinking, 
which are at the heart of VBM, were in conflict with the 
existing institutions within Eagle: 
• Within Eagle, there was a general absence of financial 
targets, accountants had a very traditional bookkeeping 
role, and budgets were used in a ceremonial way. 
• The Chief accountant who was the most visible member 
of the VBM coordination team, and it has been his job to 
explain to managers how to construct the KPIs. However, it 
is the individual managers who select their indicators and 
set their own targets. 
• NEW PMS and the new KPIs which were in 
accordance with the prevailing ways of 
thinking and the more focused production 
orientation 
• Staff within 
Eagle  they had 
to accept it, 
whether they 
liked it or not, 
since it was a 




the parent is 
seen as 
something that 
has to be 
implemented;  
VMB KPIs were 
decoupled from 
day-to-day 
activities in order 




Eagle – i.e., to 
maintain stability. 
However, with the 
introduction of the 
new PMS and the 
operational KPIs, 
accounting change 
has taken place, but 
in a reshaped form 
that does not 
threaten the 








Diagnosis of whether 
organisations have a 
predisposition to 
embrace change 
1.1. Nature of the organisation (the one subject to changes) 
The selected 








et al., 2013 
Historical Major changes throughout its history with the intended results Yes n.a. No 
Industry Industry subject to strict regulation and major external pressures  Yes No Yes 
Culture 
Does the organisation have a passive culture of acceptance of change, 
impositions, or requirements? 
Yes No Yes 
Accountability 
Is the organisation already a user of accounting procedures? Does it 
have a culture of accountability? 
Yes No Yes 
  1     0      ¾ 
  100% 0% 75% 
Encoding and enacting Facilitators, confusers or frustraters?    
Nature of change leader 
Is the leader an Insider? Yes No No 
Hybrid leader (finance knowledge + production and procedures 
knowledge)? 
Yes No Yes 
Do they have decision power and authority? Yes No Yes 
Nature of agents 
subject to change 
Do they recognise the need for change? Yes No No 
Do they trust the designers and change leaders' competences? Yes No Yes 
Nature of accounting 
change  
Does it converge toward the prevailing ways of thinking and doing 
things? Is it an abrupt change? 
Yes No Yes 
Diagnosis of organisation before introduction Yes No Yes 
Designers of tools closer to operations? No No Yes 
Were the systems' users involved in the conception of the new MAP? No No Yes 
   7/9 0      7/9 
  78% 0% 78% 
Revise or Replication 
and institutionalisation 
Facilitator or delayer?  
Only for one of 
the goals* 
Initially, the last 
three answers 
were 'no.' It only 
changed after an 
amendment 
Nature of new MAP 
/systems 
Were technical support and training assured? Yes No Yes 
Did the change include a centralised and fully integrated system, 
avoiding, for instance, manual data entry and frustration among 
users? 
No Yes Yes 
Is the change fully operational? Yes Yes Yes 
Adequate reassignment of workload and tasks? No Yes Yes 
  
 1/2  3/4 1     
  
50% 75% 100% 
     
 FINAL  76% 18% 82% 
  









Diagnosis of whether 
organisations have a 
predisposition to 
embrace change 







change in a 





Historical Major changes throughout its history with the intended results Yes No Yes 
Industry Industry subject to strict regulation and major external pressures No Yes Yes 
Culture 
Does the organisation have a passive culture of acceptance of change, 
impositions, or requirements? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Accountability 
Is the organisation already a user of accounting procedures? Does it 
have a culture of accountability? 
Yes No Yes 
   3/4  1/2 1     
  75% 50% 100% 
Encoding and enacting Facilitators, confusers or frustraters?    
Nature of Change leader 
Is the leader an Insider? No No Yes 
Hybrid leader (finance knowledge + production and procedures 
knowledge)? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Do they have decision power and authority? Yes Yes Yes 
Nature of agents 
subject to change 
Do they recognise the need for change? No Yes Yes 
Do they trust the designers and change leaders' competences? Yes Yes Yes 
Nature of Accounting 
change  
Does it converge toward the prevailing ways of thinking and doing 
things? Is it an abrupt change? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnosis of organisation before introduction No No No 
Designers of tools closer to operations? Yes Yes Yes 
Were the systems' users involved in the conception of the new MAP? Yes Yes No 
   2/3  7/9  7/9 
  67% 78% 78% 
Revise or Replication 
and institutionalisation 
Facilitator or delayer?    
Nature of new MAP 
/systems 
Were technical support and training assured? No Yes No 
Did the change include a centralised and fully integrated system, 
avoiding, for instance, manual data entry and frustration among 
users? 
No No No 
Is the change fully operational? No No No 
Adequate reassignment of workload and tasks? n.a. No No 
  
0      1/4 0     
  
0% 25% 0% 
     
 FINAL  53% 59% 65% 
  







Diagnosis of whether 
organisations have a 
predisposition to 
embrace change 







et al., 2007 
Eagle oil and gas 
company, 
Nabiha, 2005 
Historical Major changes throughout its history with the intended results Yes No No 
Industry Industry subject to strict regulation and major external pressures Yes Yes Yes 
Culture 
Does the organisation have a passive culture of acceptance of change, 
impositions, or requirements? 
Yes n.a. Yes 
Accountability 
Is the organisation already a user of accounting procedures? Does it 
have a culture of accountability? 
No Yes Yes 
   3/4  1/2  3/4 
  75% 50%   
Encoding and enacting Facilitators, confusers or frustraters?      
Nature of Change leader 
Is the leader an Insider? No Yes no 
Hybrid leader (finance knowledge + production and procedures 
knowledge)? 
Yes Yes No 
Do they have decision power and authority? Yes No Yes 
Nature of agents 
subject to change 
Do they recognise the need for change? No No No 
Do they trust the designers and change leaders' competences? Yes No Yes 
Nature of Accounting 
change  
Does it converge toward the prevailing ways of thinking and doing 
things? Is it an abrupt change? 
No No No 
Diagnosis of organisation before introduction Yes No No 
Designers of tools closer to operations? Yes Yes Yes 
Were the systems' users involved in the conception of the new MAP? Yes Yes Yes 
   2/3  4/9  4/9 
  67% 44% 44% 
Revise or Replication 
and institutionalisation 
Facilitator or delayer?    
*New PMS 
(reshaped) 
Nature of new MAP 
/systems 
Were technical support and training assured? Yes yes Yes 
Did the change include a centralised and fully integrated system, 
avoiding, for instance, manual data entry and frustration among 
users? 
Yes no Yes 
Is the change fully operational? Yes yes No 
Adequate reassignment of workload and tasks? n.a. n.a. Yes 
  
 3/4  1/2  3/4 
  
75% 50% 75% 
     










The average length of each interview was of 60 minutes. They were tape-recorded and 
transcribed. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing interviewees to participate and 
bring new ideas and perspectives. The interviews were prepared based on a review of previous 









Position within  
fifth  Stage 
Selected Company 









Face-to-Face ~ 60 min 








 2015 2016 2017 
Sales (M €) 49,8 45,8 53,5 
Volume (Thousand tons) 38,5 39,5 41,54 
Net result (M €) 1,72 2,28 2,79 





Some good examples of MA tools and practices that are being implemented in the fifth stage 
are the operational value gap, the OPEX Budget, the Annual Capital and Resource Plans, Key 
Result Areas (KRAs) and their annual targets; SMART objectives; Key Performance 







New MA tools and practices Concept 
Operational Value GAP 
Wide range of financial improvement a branch can implement. The achievable 
value gap through opportunities available must be set for a 1-2-year horizon. 
Branches must outline their total value opportunity from the best available top-
down information to identify the value gap.  
New Budgeting System 
OPEX Budget, Annual Capital and Resource Plans. Change from the bottom-up 
approach to a system where the top designs a budget with some insights from 
managers. 
New KRAs, SMART objectives and KPIs 
KRAs are areas where strong positive results must be attained to move toward 
long-term success. A balanced set of operational SMART objectives are assigned 
to each KRA and expected to be met within the terms of the operating plan. Then, 
the progress towards achieving each objective is measured and reported through 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The monthly review of each KPI and the 
measurement of value earnt allow the evaluation of performance. 
Lean tools and measures -  Six Sigma Tools 
• 8 type of waste: to identify and eliminate Value Gap and create more value in all 
processes; 
• Kaizen Concept: continuous improvement; 
• 5S & Visual Factory: workplace organisation to improve efficiency; 
• Gemba Walk: Actual process observation; 
• Value Stream Mapping: end-to-end process mapping to identify and eliminate 
value gap in processes and improve overall process lead time; 
• Activity Analysis Tools: Step-by-step work analysis to identify and eliminate the 













Fifth stage organisational chart 
      
 









Core Values of the Third, Fourth and Fifth stages 
  Companies 










• SHE- Security, Health 
and Environment 
• Accountability 
• Integrity 
•Innovation 
•Teamwork 
 
 
